Eurozone Macroeconomic Framework: Reducing Internal and External Imbalances by Wood, richard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Eurozone Macroeconomic Framework:
Reducing Internal and External
Imbalances
richard Wood
10. February 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53569/
MPRA Paper No. 53569, posted 10. February 2014 14:26 UTC
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Richard Wood 
 
 
This article reviews internal and external balance policy 
issues in the Eurozone.  The Swan diagram is used as a 
framework for assessing the policy actions needed to 
simultaneously restore both internal and external 
balance of selected Eurozone countries.  A critical 
assessment is provided of using unit labour costs as an 
indicator of external competitiveness. It is argued that 
current macroeconomic policy settings are contributing 
to declining incomes, rising unemployment, high public 
debt and deflation, while failing to correct intra-
Eurozone balance of payments disequilibria.  A new 
macroeconomic policy plan is outlined for restoring 
economic growth and reducing external imbalances 
without raising public debt.  
 
 
 
EUROZONE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK: 
REDUCING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL IMBALANCES  
Richard Wood1 
The range of macroeconomic problems afflicting many Eurozone 
countries is profound. 
Currently, individual countries within the Eurozone are seriously 
afflicted by both internal and external imbalances.  In this paper 
internal imbalances are reflected in various degrees in different 
Eurozone countries by high unemployment and high public debt.  
External imbalances are reflected in trade imbalances (which are in 
large part driven by competitiveness differences and difference in 
absorption), current account imbalances and external debts. 
Over the past 80 years, a number of prestigious Australian 
economists — Roland Wilson (1931), Trevor Swan (1953 and 1955), 
Wilfred Salter (1959) and Max Corden (1960) — contributed to the 
development of the macroeconomic analysis of internal and external 
balance in the dependent economy2.  It is suggested in this article 
that Swan’s internal and external balance diagram provides a 
relatively simple, but meaningful, framework for illustrating 
Eurozone problems and for identifying macroeconomic policy 
solutions.   
                                                          
1 I wish to thank Max Corden for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
2 See ‘Australia’s Contribution to International Trade Theory: The Dependent 
Economy Model’, Philip Metaxas and Ernst Weber, Business School, University 
of Western Australia, May 2013. 
The periphery Eurozone countries are arguably examples of the 
‘small dependent’ economies3 that Swan directed his analysis toward 
although, unlike countries such as Australia, and being in a 
monetary/currency union, they have no independent control over 
their monetary policies, or exchange rates. 
This paper argues that macroeconomic policies in the Eurozone 
countries must be coordinated domestically and across the 
Eurozone, and that an economic strategy needs to be developed 
aimed at simultaneously restoring greater internal and external 
balance.  The current problems are long-term in nature, and the ideal 
path leading to sustainable economic growth, without further raising 
public debt burdens or moving further away from external balance, is 
very narrow. 
 
Internal Imbalances 
The Eurozone countries are far from internal balance. 
a) Unemployment 
Unemployment rates provide an important indicator of internal 
imbalance.  Unemployment rates for selected Eurozone counties are 
shown in Column 1 of Table 1 below.  Country rankings of 
unemployment rates are provided in Column 2. 
b) The public debt burden 
A second indicator of internal imbalance used in this paper is the 
public debt burden (net public debt as a percentage of GDP).  Public 
                                                          
3  These small dependent economies are economies where the prices of 
exports and imports are determined on world markets and cannot be 
influenced by domestic conditions of supply and demand. 
debt ratios are provided in Column 2 of Table 1 below.  Country 
rankings of the public debt burdens are provided in Column 4. 
c) The overall measure of internal imbalance 
The estimate of the overall degree of internal imbalance is 
provided in Column 5 of Table 1.  Column 5 is derived as the simple 
average of the rankings provided in Columns 2 and 4.  The implicit 
simplifying assumption here is that, from the policy maker’s 
viewpoint, high unemployment and high public debt are of broadly 
equal concern. 
As can be observed from Column 5 of Table 1, Germany is relatively 
close to internal balance, whereas Greece and Portugal have the 
largest internal imbalances. 
    
Table 1: Internal Imbalances (2012) 
Unemployment  Rates       Public debt/GDP  Average  
                          Rank         Rank Rank  
Germany 5.5  1   57       1     1 
France  10.3  2   83  3     2.5 
 Ireland  14.7  4   92  4            4  
Spain  25.0  7   73  2     4.5 
Portugal 15.6  5   112  6     5.5 
Greece  24.2  6   154  7     6.5 
Italy  10.7  3   106  5     4 
 
External Imbalances 
In respect of illustrating external imbalances in the Eurozone, this 
article focusses on periphery countries with balance of payments 
deficits in juxtaposition to Germany which has a large balance of 
payments surplus. 
a) Current account imbalances 
A common measure of external imbalance is provided by the size of 
the current account deficit relative to GDP.  For the purposes of this 
paper, each country’s current account/GDP imbalance and their 
ranking are provided in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 24.  Because the 
current account imbalances are heavily influenced by the 
compression in absorption and imports occasioned by the deepening 
recessions in periphery countries, it was decided to use the 8 year 
(2005 to 2012) average estimate as the basis for calculating Columns 
1 and 2 in Table 2.  The estimates in columns 1 and 2 are likely to be 
somewhat closer to the underlying structural current account 
deficits. 
b) External debt 
Another element of external imbalance used in this analysis is the 
level of external debt relative to a country’s GDP.  See Columns 3 and 
4 of Table 2. 
c) The overall measure of external imbalance 
The overall measure of external imbalance (Column 5 of Table 2) is 
obtained by averaging the rankings reported in columns 2 and 4.  
Again, the implied assumption is that policy maker’s view high 
                                                          
4 Ideally only intra-Eurozone current account imbalance should be used in this 
calculation, but that data is not readily available to the author. 
current account deficits and high external debt as all of equal 
importance.  Greece and Portugal are furthest from external balance. 
   
Table 2: External Imbalances (2012) 
     CAD*         External      Average          
                 Debt **   Rank       
      Rank         Rank            
  
Germany         +6.3         5    168        2       3.5  
France         -1.3         1    198        4      2.5  
Ireland          -1.6         2    1028      7      4.5      
Spain          -6.2         4    171        3      3.5  
Portugal          -9.2        6     299        6      6  
Greece          -10.4       7    231        5      6   
Italy            -1.9        3    122        1      2  
     
*Percentage of GDP based on average values over period 2005 to 2012.           
** Percentage of GDP  
 
The Swan Diagram for Eurozone Countries 
Chart 3 illustrates the Swan Diagram as applied to selected Eurozone 
countries.  The relative locations of each country on the diagram are 
determined by the average rankings recorded in Tables 1 and 2. The 
vertical axis reports the cost ratio, defined as R/W, where R is the 
international price level and W is the domestic money wages. 
Germany with its very large current account surplus (which should, in 
reality, attract a relatively high weighting among policy objectives), 
and significant under-full employment, is located in Zone II of the 
Swan Diagram.  It is suggested in this article, and by the IMF and 
other commentators, that Germany could usefully raise real wage 
levels to stimulate demand, and to facilitate an adjustment aimed at 
lowering the current account surplus and contributing to the internal 
devaluations needed by the periphery countries.  Generally, 
therefore, Germany would seem to be located in the North-West 
quadrant of the Swan diagram. 
The periphery countries are very far from both internal and external 
balance and, with high under-full employment and significant 
underlying balance of payments deficits, are located in Zone III of the 
Swan diagram.  For the periphery countries with high and rising debt 
burdens and high and rising unemployment, it seems clear — given 
the contractionary consequences to date of Eurozone fiscal austerity 
policies — that real expenditures would need to be boosted if their 
economies were to be able to move in the direction of greater 
internal balance.  All other things equal, this requirement, and the 
fact that periphery countries need to lower money wages and export 
prices, would locate these countries in the South-West quadrant of 
the Swan diagram.   
The above reasoning underpins the location, by quadrant, of the 
relative average ranking on the diagram below.  The presentation is 
illustrative only. 
The use by Swan of R/W as the cost ratio is, of course, an 
approximation in the intra-Eurozone case.  As the earlier analysis in 
this article suggests, while reductions in the money wage are 
necessary, it is the prices of exported goods and services in the Zone 
III countries that need to fall relative to the prices of German 
exports.   
 
Chart 3: The Swan Diagram — Selected Eurozone Countries 
 
 
To be successful going forward, the highly indebted periphery 
countries must now adopt macroeconomic policy strategies that will 
steer them from their current locations onto a path leading toward 
the intersection of the internal balance and external balance 
isoquants.  Arguably, the shortest and most effective route is a 
straight line.   
It is crucial that the macroeconomic policies assembled to reduce 
external and internal imbalance be fully coordinated, and applied 
simultaneously, so that the economy can move in the desired 
direction, and so that progress on one objective (say, greater internal 
balance) is not offset by a slippage with the other objective (greater 
external balance).  
The difficulties should not be underestimated.  The individual 
Eurozone countries have no control over their monetary policies.  
This greatly limits their ability to increase real expenditures.  
However, insofar as individual Eurozone countries still have 
independent fiscal policies they are still able, via that route, to affect 
real expenditures (absorption).  
If only ‘real expenditure’ is increased (and the ‘cost ratio’ is not 
simultaneously increased) the periphery countries would move 
further away from external balance, as absorption and imports 
would increase when expenditure is raised.  If only the ‘cost ratio’ 
was increased by reducing wages (and ‘real expenditure’ was not 
increased simultaneously) then the economy would move further 
away from internal balance, as the reduction in wage incomes would 
result in lower level of domestic expenditure and demand. 
 
Competitiveness and the Failure of Internal Devaluation 
The cost ratio in the Swan diagram is intended to be representative 
of the policy parameter needed to change competitiveness. 
The most commonly used indicator of competitiveness in the 
Eurozone is the unit labour cost comparison (see Chart 1).  By 
observing the movements over time in relative unit labour costs one 
gains the impression that substantial favourable adjustments are 
taking place in relative price competitiveness differences within the 
Eurozone.  Unfortunately this is not the case. 
The two main important weaknesses of the unit labour cost 
comparison is that it represents labour costs only and it is calculated 
for the whole economy rather than for the traded goods sector. 
 
Chart 1: Nominal Unit Labour Cost-Based Competitiveness 
Comparison 
 
 
 
A more accurate reflection of international price competitiveness 
differences is provided by Chart 2.  On this basis there has been no 
effective internal devaluation5 in the selected Eurozone countries 
                                                          
5  Eurozone countries have no independent control over their exchange rates.  
They cannot devalue by adjusting the exchange rate and can only do so by 
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since the beginning of the global financial crisis. This is so despite 
years of attempting to devalue internally, and the fact that there 
have been, as Chart 1 demonstrates, some improvements in some 
countries in unit labour costs movements relative to those in 
Germany.  
For a more complete analysis of the limitations of the unit labour 
costs indicator of competitiveness see the Appendix.  
 
Chart 2: Export Price-Based Competitiveness Indicator 
 
 
Austerity, internal devaluation and the effects on real wages 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
deflating domestic wages and prices relative to trading partner countries.  The 
process of deflating internal wages and prices to improve one’s external 
competitiveness is called ‘internal devaluation’.  In this process it is not 
necessary that all wage rates and all domestic prices be deflated, but those in 
the traded goods sector must be deflated for the policy to be effective.  In the 
deflation process it is not a requirement that real wage levels should fall.  All 
that is required is that traded goods prices fall relative to those in trading 
partner countries. 
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The architects of austerity and internal devaluation policies believe 
that those policies can bring about needed reductions in wages and 
prices. According to the theory, austerity reduces aggregate demand 
and pushes-up unemployment.  In turn, the higher unemployment is 
expected to moderate wage claims, and lead to the required 
reductions in nominal wages.  Prices are then expected to fall down 
in line with wages.  The intended result is that national price levels 
decline in trade deficit countries (relative to those in surplus 
countries), and competitiveness in the deficit countries is improved. 
Austerity and internal devaluation policies in Eurozone countries are 
failing because rigidities in labour markets preclude market forces — 
high unemployment — from driving down nominal wages sufficiently 
in some countries.  As well, and probably more importantly, there 
appears to be insufficient competition in product markets in some 
deficit countries, and, consequently, prices of domestically produced 
goods do not always fall, pari passu, in line with nominal wages. 
Because nominal wages have weakened more than prices in some 
periphery countries, one important consequence of internal 
devaluation is that real wages will have fallen between 2009 and 
2014 as follows:  in Greece (around 22 %), Spain (7 %), Portugal (6 
%), Ireland (4 %) and Italy (2 %)6.  Between 2008 and 2012, real 
wages fell by 10 % in the United Kingdom (IMF Article IV Report, 
United Kingdom, 2013).  Between 2008 and 2011, real wages fell by 2 
% in Estonia and by 5 % in Lithuania. 
Real wage cuts are a double-edged sword: they have both income 
and cost effects.  When nominal and real wages have fallen, and 
when the labour income share in National Income and consumer 
                                                          
6 See Ronald Janssen ‘Real Wages in the Eurozone: Not a Double but a 
Continuing Dip’, 2013. 
demand have also fallen, and profitability is high, further cuts in 
nominal and real wage costs would have minimal effects in terms of 
reducing unemployment.  In such circumstances, further cuts in 
nominal and real wage incomes would lead to further stagnation in 
consumer demand and economic activity and add to unemployment.  
In such cases, increased nominal and real wages7 could lift consumer 
and aggregate demand, and hence employment8.  
 
A Deepening Eurozone Crisis? 
Not only are falling real wage incomes dragging down aggregate 
demand in some periphery countries, but there are now many other 
reasons why one might expect that the Eurozone crisis could deepen 
further.   For example: 
                                                          
7   In its latest Article IV Report on Germany the IMF has said that it would not 
be inappropriate for Germany to increase real wages in order to raise domestic 
demand and to offset external shocks (that is, the weakening demand for 
German exports). 
8  All else equal, countries with large trade surpluses, an undervalued real 
effective exchange rate and depressed internal demand (such as Germany) 
could also possibly benefit from increased real wages. After a decade or more 
of pursuing wage restraint policies, real wages in Germany are arguably lower 
than the real wage levels that would be consistent with full employment and 
external balance. Such policy action by Germany would also contribute to 
stronger economic growth and greater external balance within the Eurozone.  
If Germany relied on an appreciation of the Euro (rather than increased wages) 
to contribute toward a reduction in its current account surplus then the 
periphery countries would suffer as a consequence of a lower level of 
competitiveness against non-Eurozone countries. 
 
i) Based on data available at the time of writing, real wage 
incomes in Germany are projected to fall in 2013 and retail sales 
have weakened further; 
ii) Unemployment is still rising in many Eurozone countries; 
iii) The paradigm, prevalent in Europe, that asserts that 
unemployment can be resolved by supply-side reforms and further 
real wage cutting, rather than by increasing aggregate demand, is 
misplaced;  
iv) Producer prices in the Eurozone fell by 1.2 percent in the year 
to November 2013.  German inflation is now also dangerously low — 
requiring deeper deflation and income contraction in the periphery 
countries as they try to achieve internal devaluations;  
v) The financial system in the Eurozone is still characterised by 
fragmentation in credit markets, and the presence of relatively high 
underlying real longer-term borrowing interest rates charged by 
banks in periphery countries; 
vi) High, and still rising, public debt burdens in periphery countries 
continue to confound the return to financial stability. The Northern 
authorities have turned their backs on debt mutualisation or 
forgiveness;  
vii) The high German savings rate;  
viii) The massive German current account surplus (at 7 per cent, 
three times that of China, relative to GDP in 2012); 
ix) The continuing Euro appreciation, which lowers import prices, 
adding to the deflationary tendency; 
x) The ECB is continuing to focus on price stability, and 
contracting the balance sheet of the Euro-system.  The pace of credit 
contraction in the Euro-system is now greater than ever before.  The 
ECB continues to drain funds from banks to offset its government 
bond holdings;  
xi) Deleveraging is far from complete among impaired sovereigns 
and among the private banks, there is limited bank intermediation, 
and available bank credit for small and medium enterprises is in 
short supply (due, in part, to bank deleveraging and under-
capitalisation, increasing non-performing loans, higher capital 
requirements, cross-border capital flows shrinking as banks withdraw 
behind national borders, and compressed interest rate margins).  The 
banking system in Germany is particularly exposed;  
xii) Fiscal policy conservatism is still very deeply entrenched at the 
highest levels in Germany, and there is no common budget in the 
Eurozone or effective fiscal transfer mechanism; 
xiii) ‘Uncertainty’ is at an elevated level in Germany and elsewhere 
in the Eurozone, economic policy action is constrained by outdated 
laws and treaties, and there is currently no comprehensive, 
coordinated plan to revive economic growth, create employment 
and reduce underlying external account imbalances.  
 
The Potential Importance of Policy Failings in the Eurozone 
The importance of all the issues raised above cannot be 
overestimated. They bear on, and support, the US Treasury’s analysis 
in its Report to the Congress on International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies (October 2013)9.   
                                                          
9 In one fundamental paragraph, the important US Treasury Report states: ‘To 
ease the adjustment process within the euro area, countries with large and 
persistent surpluses need to take action to boost domestic demand growth and 
In that report, the US Treasury is highly critical of the lack of 
adjustment in the Eurozone, Germany’s constrained demand and 
Germany’s large current account surplus; developments that the US 
Treasury rightly claims are creating a deflationary bias in the 
Eurozone area.   
The resolution of the intra-Eurozone competitiveness mismatches 
(via internal devaluation in the South and internal appreciation in the 
North), the resolution of recessions/depressions and the resolution 
of the excessive debt burdens (via debt forgiveness, debt 
restructuring and economic growth), form three central 
macroeconomic solutions to the on-going European crisis.  
With German inflation falling to current low levels, the only way that 
internal devaluation could possibly work under the current ‘Berlin’ 
orthodoxy — within a meaningful time frame, and without a major 
German wage-fiscal-demand-price-reflation — would be by much 
deeper austerity and substantial wage and price deflations in 
periphery countries, and in other countries as well.  The costs of that 
approach — in terms of demand contraction, higher unemployment 
and increased debt burdens in periphery countries in particular — 
could be catastrophic, particularly if austerity, indiscriminately-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
shrink their surpluses.   Germany has maintained a large current account 
surplus throughout the euro area financial crisis, and in 2012, Germany’s 
nominal current account surplus was larger than that of China.  Germany’s 
anaemic pace of domestic demand growth and dependence on exports have 
hampered rebalancing at a time when many other euro area countries have 
been under severe pressure to curb demand and compress imports in order to 
promote adjustment.  The net result has been a deflationary bias for the euro 
area, as well as for the world economy.  Stronger domestic demand growth in 
surplus European economies, particularly in Germany, would help to facilitate a 
durable rebalancing of imbalances in the euro area’. See Report to Congress on 
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, US Department of the 
Treasury, Office of International Affairs, 30 October 2013. 
operating market forces, and deflationary-wage-and-price-reducing-
structural-reforms are relied upon to drive the adjustment.   
In a liquidity trap real interest rates are likely to be already too high.  
The faster the pace of wage and price deflation in a liquidity trap 
environment (where interest rates are kept at or near zero bound), 
the higher becomes the real interest rate and the public debt 
burden.  The higher real interest rates encourage additional savings 
at the expense of consumption, particularly if uncertainty increases, 
leading to an even deeper collapse in aggregate demand.  The rising 
public debt burden risks higher internal and external borrowing 
costs, credit shortfalls, capital flight, demands for new foreign loans, 
and an ultimate financial crisis.  Without substantial debt 
rescheduling/forgiveness, interest payments to foreign creditors 
mount further. The downward spiral accelerates.   
One central element of the German orthodoxy — reliance on ‘market 
forces’ — is a mixture of older Marshallian-type economic 
philosophy and modern neo-liberalism.  Many counties have had 
direct experience with the reliance on ‘market forces’ to bring about 
major adjustments in wage and price levels.  For instance, in 
Australia an austere policy of relying on high unemployment and 
market forces was adopted between 1975 and 1982, and was 
persevered with, as a means to defeat inflation, to reduce real wages 
and to increase employment, and it failed.  Austerity, and a similar 
reliance on market forces, are policies that are now failing in the 
Eurozone. 
The current Eurozone-Maastricht policy framework is profoundly 
flawed, and is increasingly untenable. The presence of the liquidity 
trap continues to confound economic recovery in the Eurozone.  
Public debt burdens continue to rise, aided by fiscal austerity 
policies, and are projected by the IMF to be much higher in 2016 
than in 2012 in periphery countries.  Unemployment rates will be 
higher in most of them as well. Internal devaluation has failed.  
Under present macroeconomic policy settings, economic 
fundamentals in the currency zone are getting worse, not better, and 
long-term economic stagnation is likely, as was the case with those 
countries that clung onto the Gold Standard in the 1930s.  Sustained 
under-consumption is a current threat in number of periphery 
countries. 
• The IMF now regards it essential to boost aggregate demand in 
Eurozone countries (see Christine Lagarde, ‘Re-empowering the 
global economy’, Economia, 27 December 2013). 
• However, Chancellor Merkel’s New Year speech calling for a 
‘balanced budget’ was very disappointing, and 
counterproductive to required expansion and adjustment 
within the Eurozone.  Furthermore, one of the latest papers 
published by the Deutsche Bundesbank denies that there is any 
risk of deflation in the Eurozone area.   
• On January 7, 2014, following the Eurostat release showing that 
Eurozone inflation fell to 0.8 per cent in December 2013, US 
Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, issued a clear call for Germany to 
boost growth to avoid deflation. 
Unfortunately, misplaced orthodoxies, misinterpretations about the 
progress being made with internal devaluation, and the support for 
contractionary fiscal policy and even lower wage incomes in 
periphery countries, remain as strong as ever in Germany10.  The 
conflict facing Eurozone policy-makers in following the German 
                                                          
10 To simultaneously move toward greater internal and external balance 
Germany must simultaneously increase real expenditure and real wages. 
monetary, fiscal and wages policy prescriptions is simply ignored.   
That conflict is simply between i) seeking greater internal balance 
(increasing wages, consumer spending and public expenditure in 
Eurozone countries, avoiding deflation and reducing unemployment), 
and ii) seeking greater external balance (reducing wages in periphery 
countries in an attempt to induce competitiveness adjustments 
within the Eurozone rather than also expanding demand and raising 
wages and prices in surplus countries).  The Germans and the EU 
support ii), to the exclusion of i). Very unfortunately for all, the 
German/EU policy is not working. 
 
The period ahead 
Without a political commitment to boost aggregate demand — and a 
preparedness to adjust and radically reverse current economic 
policies — economic conditions in the Eurozone could well 
deteriorate further as 2014 unfolds.  The timing of events remains 
uncertain of course, and there is a something of a ‘false dawn’ at the 
moment, as periphery countries are benefitting from the 
consequences of demand-contractionary-induced improvements in 
trade and current account deficits.  This is taking pressure off the 
need for capital inflow, possibly contributing to lower interest rate 
risk premia and superficially suggesting that intra-zone external 
imbalances have been very substantially reduced.  However, this will 
all unwind if ever aggregate demand starts to pick up.  In such 
circumstances, if there is not an adequate increase in the cost ratio 
(reduction in money wages) and a reduction in the prices of 
exportables produced in the periphery countries, then some form of 
import constraints —higher tariffs or quantitative import controls — 
may be necessary to head off the likely increase in external 
imbalances. 
As 2014 unfolds the fragility of the Eurozone, and surrounding 
countries, is still likely to present a continuing serious threat to global 
financial stability and ongoing global expansion.  Conceivably, if the 
United States Fed tapering can be achieved without financial stress 
in 2014; if Japan’s incipient recovery continues; if emerging 
economies can maintain economic stability; and if exchange rates 
don’t become grossly misaligned as a result of QE policies in various 
countries, tapering in the United States and currency wars, then the 
Eurozone crisis may well represent the major threat to global 
stability in late 2014.   
It is in the interests of all countries that outdated and inappropriate 
orthodoxies and related macroeconomic policies are changed before 
a new European crisis erupts, as the Eurozone economy is relatively  
large (at around 75% of the size of the US economy).  
 It is also in the longer-term interest of all that internal devaluation 
and convergence in Eurozone countries is achieved: otherwise the 
Eurozone will never be able to issue bond with multiple and joint 
liability, and the international financial system will remain 
unbalanced. 
 
Macroeconomic Policy  
Based on the above analysis the following agenda would represent a 
comprehensive macroeconomic policy response to the on-going 
European crisis, aimed at achieving greater internal and external 
balance. Taking into account the different problems of each country, 
the proposed overarching strategy would be designed to operate in a 
number of countries simultaneously in a mutually re-enforcing 
manner. 
i) Debt rescheduling or partial debt forgiveness for countries at or 
near insolvency. 
ii) Coordinated formal centralised tripartite wage and price 
policies, aimed at restoring greater underlying external balance by 
lowering labour cost and export prices and restoring competiveness 
in deficit countries, raising wages and prices in surplus countries, 
countering the tendency toward deflation, avoiding unnecessary 
reductions in real wage incomes, and ensuring adequate business 
profitability.  New, or re-invigorated, ‘internal competition’ policies 
will need to be developed to ensure appropriate internal price 
responses follow in the wake of the further lowering of nominal 
wages.  Price and wage behaviour will need to be closely monitored 
by Governments. 
iii) Avoidance of fiscal austerity policies, and related unnecessary 
reductions in real after-tax wage incomes; and avoidance of further  
‘bail-outs’ which only add further to the debt burdens of periphery 
countries.  
iv) Avoidance of ‘quantitative easing’ policies which are unproven 
and have major risks and adverse side-effects, such as asset price 
bubbles, currency devaluation, the distortion of risk assumption and 
resource allocation, and the creation of destabilising international 
capital movements.  Quantitative easing does not deliver new money 
to the unemployed, the disadvantaged or to other citizens who have 
a relatively high propensity to consume ordinary goods and services.  
Rather, the new money created by quantitative easing flows to the 
banks, the speculators, the financial engineers, to bank reserve 
accounts and to hedge funds.  Because new money is a precious 
resource it should not be expended, via quantitative easing, in an 
unlimited, open-ended operation with little impact on real activity.  
At some point the new money may need to be withdrawn: bond 
prices could then fall sharply and market instability could be 
substantial. 
v) Policies need to be pro-active, not just designed to buy more 
time. They also need to be tailor-made to some degree to address 
the particular problems faced by different countries.   
vi) Overall, there needs to be an over-riding strategy involving the 
adoption of highly-coordinated medium-term monetary and fiscal 
policies aimed at restoring internal balance by stimulating internal 
expenditure and domestic demand.  Countries with large current 
account surpluses and relatively low levels of public debt are 
particularly well placed to expand demand, but they alone cannot be 
relied upon to provide adequate demand in periphery countries. 
vii) Wide-spread stimulatory fiscal policies (which would work to 
lower unemployment) are required but these policies cannot be 
permitted to increase public debt in already highly-indebted nations.  
This rules out the use of new bond financed budget deficits.  
Monetary and fiscal policies must be functionally coordinated and 
work simultaneously, and in tandem, to increase expenditures 
without increasing public debt.  This could be achieved by overt 
money financing of budget deficits11.  This relatively powerful 
                                                          
11 See Richard Wood, ‘A Strong Case for Monetisation of On-going Budget 
Deficits in European Periphery Countries’, Roubini EconoMonitor: June 15, 
2013.  Also see How to Solve the European Economic Crisis, Amazon Book, 11 
December 2012 and ‘The Economic Crisis: How to Stimulate Economies 
Without Increasing Public Debt’, CEPR Policy Insight Paper, Vox Economics, 
September 2012. 
monetary and fiscal policy combination is not precluded by Article 
123 of the Lisbon Treaty12.  Strict legislative limits could be invoked in 
relation to the magnitude of the overt money financing operation.  
There would be little risk of inflation given the high levels of 
unemployment and underutilised capacity.  Should demand-pull or 
cost-push inflation threaten in the future, as the economies reach 
much higher levels of capacity utilisation, then any excess liquidity 
could be sterilized or bank reserve ratios increased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
12 See Biagio Bassone and Richard Wood, ‘Overt Money Financing of Fiscal 
Deficits: Navigating Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty’, Roubini EconoMonitor, 22 
July 2013.  Also see Cattaneo, M and Zibordi, G (2013), ‘Una soluzione per 
l’euro: gli strumenti per rimettere in moto l’econormia italiana’, Hoepli Editore, 
forthcoming. 
 
APPENDIX: Weaknesses in Unit Labour Cost Comparisons 
Measures of ‘international competitiveness’, for example those 
based on broad wage, unit labour cost and price parameters are 
approximations only13.   Some are more relevant than others.   
Unit labour cost-based measures of competitiveness are common-
place in the literature.  Those estimates show that German unit 
labour costs remained broadly unchanged between 2000 and 2009, 
while they rose by about one third in the rest of the Eurozone14.   
Since 2008, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain have made some 
progress in reducing their unit labour cost gaps with Germany (see 
Chart 1), with the decline in unit labour costs in those countries often 
being larger in the tradable sector than in the non-tradable sector15.  
Greece and Ireland have recorded the largest improvements in 
relative unit labour costs since end-2008 (a fall of around 19 and 17 
per cent in their relative unit labour costs vis-a-vis Germany, 
respectively).  In the case of Ireland this substantial adjustment 
partly reflects the relatively high degree of labour-employer 
cooperation in that country16.   
                                                          
13   The Global Competitiveness Report 2013/14 (World Economic Forum, 
2013) takes into account 12 different parameters to develop its overall 
measure of international competitiveness, including institutions, 
infrastructure, technology, labour market efficiency and product market 
efficiency, etc. 
14 See Martin Lueck, ‘European Economic Focus: Germany’s current account 
surplus and Europe’s rebalancing’, UBS, November 2013. 
15 See Euro Area Policies, 2013 Article IV Consultation Report, IMF, July 2013. 
16 According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, 
2013-14, Ireland is highly ranked in ‘cooperation in labour-employee relations’ 
at rank 13, and above Germany (with the rank of 18).  Dickens et al. found that 
in his sample of 16 countries Ireland had the highest degree of nominal wage 
flexibility and was among those countries with the lowest incidence of 
employment protection legislation and the highest degree of coordination in 
It seems clear that reducing unit labour costs in uncompetitive 
countries is a sine qua non for internal devaluation to be successful. 
Unit labour costs can be reduced either by reducing wage and/or 
non-wage labour costs, or by increasing labour productivity. 
However, there are at least six analytical qualifications attaching to 
the use of unit labour cost-based measures as the sole basis for 
competitiveness comparisons: 
a) First, if there are different evolutions of labour costs and 
productivity in the traded and non-traded goods sectors, it is 
possible that an overall increase in relative unit labour costs 
could be due to relatively high unit labour cost growth in the 
non-traded goods sector, with little direct impact on 
competitiveness.  The IMF17 concludes that this was the case 
between 2000 and 2007 in Greece and Ireland, and to a much 
lesser extent in Portugal and Spain.  
b) Second, if production structures and the degree of 
mechanisation and technological development are broadly the 
same as between two countries then unit labour costs may be 
meaningfully compared.  But if the production, specialisation, 
product quality and technology structures, and export 
compositions are radically different, say as between Germany 
and Greece, or change through time, then one would need to 
be cautious when using unit labour cost index changes alone to 
draw strong inferences about changing competitiveness 
differences between Germany and Greece.  Spain has been 
relatively successful in restructuring toward export activities, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
bargaining at a high level.  See ‘How Wages Change: Micro Evidence from the 
International Wage Flexibility Project’, William T. Dickens et al., Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol 21, Number 2, Spring, 2007. 
17 See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
for example, whereas this may not have been the case for 
Greece. 
c) Third, another reason why prices may not always move 
in-tandem with unit labour costs (across Eurozone countries in 
the short to medium terms) is because internal price 
competition policies may differ: the intensity of price 
competition may vary across countries, and through time. 
d) Fourth, profit margins can be subject to substantial 
volatility, particularly in the traded-goods sector of the 
economy.  Changing profit margins could cause 
competitiveness to vary from that suggested by relative 
movements in unit labour costs. 
e) Fifth, unit labour costs relate to ‘labour’ costs alone.  
Capital, land, energy and finance combine with labour to create 
exports or domestic production to replace imports.  A country 
could rate poorly on unit labour costs, but more than make-up 
for that through relatively low unit capital costs, energy, land 
and borrowing costs.  
f) Finally, when countries experience recessions and 
depressions there is a natural weeding-out of relatively high 
cost business operations.  It would be expected, therefore, that 
firms paying relatively high wages or experiencing relatively low 
productivity growth — that is, relatively high unit labour cost 
firms — would close. The closure of such firms would work to 
lower measured unit labour costs.  However, the observed 
recorded reduction in unit labour costs does not, in this case, 
imply improved competitiveness.  
Importantly, the unit labour cost chart is, of course, not a measure of 
the ‘price competitiveness’ of traded goods and services.   Even so, 
the unit labour cost chart is used almost universally as an indicator of 
intra-Eurozone competitiveness. This partly reflects the fact that the 
President of the European Council (Hermann Van Rompuy) uses it 
repeatedly for that purpose.  The unit labour cost chart is also a key 
indicator in the European Union’s Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Procedure.  Almost all economists, particularly those in Europe, are 
addicted to it (possibly because it appears to suggest a much needed 
‘good news’ story).   
The unit labour cost (ULC) chart is, however, without very heavily 
qualified interpretation, grossly misleading when used in the Intra-
Eurozone trade competitiveness context.  Apart from the disparate 
trade imbalances existing at the base year, one of the main problems 
with it (alluded to earlier) is that it measures ULC for the whole 
economy, and not just for the traded goods sector. The traded goods 
sector is usually the most competitive sector in any economy, and 
this is particularly the case for competing contiguous periphery 
countries in Europe. 
To illustrate just how misleading ULC comparisons can be, the unit 
labour cost comparison (Chart 1, shown in the main text) suggests 
that Ireland experienced the worst competitiveness conditions of all 
periphery countries up until 2009. This view is totally mistaken. The 
mistake can be easily confirmed by observing the export price trade 
competitiveness comparison (Chart 2, shown in the main text)18.  
That comparison shows that Ireland never had a significant price 
                                                          
18   The export price competitiveness indicator does not suffer the many 
problems of the economy-wide unit labour cost indicator, and represents 
competitiveness based on the price of traded goods and estimated prices of 
services at the border. 
competitiveness imbalance vis-à-vis Germany.  That view is 
confirmed in studies which suggest that Ireland was unsustainably 
super-competitive in 1999 (at the formation of the Eurozone) when 
its trade surplus stood at a massive 25 per cent of GDP, rising to 30 
per cent a few years later.   
Furthermore, between 2000 and 2007, whereas NULC measured for 
the whole Irish economy rose by around 30 per cent or so relative to 
NULC measured for the whole Germany economy, relative NULCs 
measured for the manufacturing sectors for both Ireland and 
Germany were relatively stable (that is to say, there was no loss of 
trend competitiveness in the sector of the Irish economy most linked 
to intra-Eurozone trade — the manufacturing sector)19.  This 
observation supports, and is consistent with, the message in the 
export price indicator (see Chart 2, later), and the fact that Ireland’s 
trade surplus remained relatively very high, standing at around 20 
per cent of GDP in 2009. 
 
                                                          
19 An analysis of Irish competitiveness conducted by the Irish Central Bank finds 
that ‘the deterioration in manufacturing price competitiveness was due almost 
entirely to [Euro] exchange rate movements’, not to unit labour cost 
movements.  It also states that ‘In 2008 in the internationally traded goods 
industrial sector wage compensation per hour was lower in Ireland than the 
Eurozone average’.  See ‘Measuring Price and Labour Cost Competitiveness’, 
Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Bulletin, January 2010. 
